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The 2017 Maryland
Constitutional Law Schmooze
THE COLLAPSE OF THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE:
THE SCHMOOZE PROJECT
MARK A. GRABER
For more than twenty years, the participants in the Georgetown Constitutional Law Schmooze, the Maryland/Georgetown Constitutional Law
Schmooze, and now the Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze, as well as
participants in constitutional law schmoozes at Princeton and Wisconsin,
have engaged in a common enterprise that we might call “the schmooze project.” The existence and nature of any “schmooze project” is my synthesis,
not the publicly acknowledged consensus of the whole. Still, the papers submitted, conversations initiated, and scholarship published by schmooze participants indicate that Georgetown, Princeton, Wisconsin, and Maryland have
been sites for developing a distinctive approach to constitutionalism. This
distinctive approach provides important and better conceptual tools for understanding contemporary constitutional predicaments in the United States

© 2017 Mark A. Graber.
 Regents Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Special thanks to President Jay
Perman, Senior Vice President Bruce Jarrell, Dean Donald Tobin, and (happily in his mind) former
Associate Dean Maxwell Stearns for their extraordinary efforts that made this talk possible. The
list of schmoozers and colleagues to thank would be nearly endless. The great difficulty giving a
talk and writing papers at a certain stage of your career is that by the time you reach that stage of
your career when someone might ask you to talk about your ideas, you can no longer distinguish
your ideas from those of your friends, colleagues and family. What seems today’s fresh insight, I
fear, was first suggested by Sandy Levinson, Leslie Goldstein, Keith Whittington, Rogers Smith,
Emily Zackin, Linda McClain or one of the hundreds of other schmoozers, in their contributions to
a past Schmooze, or perhaps in a more offhand comment during the Schmooze’s traditional Friday
night Indian buffet during a schmooze five years ago, or offered during a Maryland Law faculty
workshop by Maxwell Stearns, Jana Singer, Donald Gifford, Danielle Citron, Taunya Banks, Richard Boldt or another of my wonderful colleagues. The thought may have even come from Dr. Julia
Frank as an aside when we were watching the latest Murdoch Mystery. The best I can hope is you
have forgotten your insight or that you forgive my more frequent lapses of memory.
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and abroad, and for reforming contemporary constitutional institutions to
meet unprecedented challenges to constitutional democracy.
Schmoozers in this symposium and elsewhere are replacing a New Deal
conceptual universe structured by a sharp distinction between law and politics with a conceptual universe structured by constitutional politics. Constitutional politics consists of the struggles between proponents of different constitutional visions that take place throughout the political universe.
Constitutional politics occurs, for example, when national political parties
write platforms committing their coalition to repealing race based preferences in university admissions, when state governors veto legislation repealing such measures, and when courts declare that elected officials may use
race to promote diversity, but not to compensate for general societal disadvantage.1 People engage in constitutional politics when they protest voluntary prayers at town council meetings, ask their neighbor to sign petitions
calling for an end to those prayers, and litigate the relevant establishment
clause issues before high courts.2 The constitutional law of the land at any
particular time is a complex amalgam of all these practices, not simply a synthesis of opinions written by Supreme Court Justices.
This Essay begins by describing briefly how the New Deal conceptual
universe we inherited as scholars was largely limited to delineating and often
attempting to enforce different manifestations of the law/politics distinction.
Part II details how schmoozers for a generation have undermined that
law/politics distinction as a foundation for studying constitutional institutions, the allocation of constitutional authority, constitutional practice, and
constitutional history. Part III introduces readers to the notion of constitutional politics and the tools constitutional politics provides for understanding
constitutional practice in the United States and other constitutional democracies. Part IV elaborates how constitutional politics provides better conceptual tools for identifying the underlying causes of constitutional crises
throughout the contemporary constitutional universe and for thinking about
how political actors might maintain constitutional democracy in the United
States during the age of Donald Trump and abroad in the face of contemporary challenges.
The pages below have three central purposes. The first is to identify a
cohort of scholars that I believe to be united by a common project of collapsing a New Deal conceptual universe structured by an iron distinction between
law and politics. The second is to suggest that rather than distinguish between law and politics—and insist that courts remain in the law lane—constitutional scholarship would be better off thinking about better and worse
1. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
2. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
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ways in which law and politics are mutually constructive. The third is to
continue the moves, particular in American constitution scholarship from
constitutional law, the constitutional rules made by the Supreme Court of the
United States and other judicial tribunals, to constitutional design, the institutional rules and practice that structure constitutional and political decisionmaking, to the nature of the entire constitutional regime. This Essay outlines the ways in which politics, law, economics, culture and other factors
might interact to construct a healthy constitutional regime and, in present circumstances, how those factors are undermining the American constitutional
regime and other constitutional democracies.
I. THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE
American constitutional and legal thought when older members of the
schmooze generation came of age was structured by a sharp division between
law and politics. Virtually every major piece of scholarship published in law
and political science probed some aspect of this division. The distinction
between law and politics provided the underlying structure to works exploring the institutional responsibilities of the different governing branches, elaborating the justificatory logics legitimately available to each governing institution, discussing the allocation of constitutional authority, detailing
American constitutional development, and explaining judicial decisionmaking. Prominent titles included “Law or Politics,” “Is Law Politics,” or similar.3
A remarkable range of scholars shared this concern with elaborating the
distinction between law and politics. The not-so-short list would include
what the law professor Mark Tushnet describes as doing “grand [constitutional] theory”4 and what the political scientist Nancy Maveety describes as
“pioneers of judicial behavior.”5 No brief composite can do justice to the
richness of that scholarship, capture important nuances in how different
scholars conceptualized the law/politics distinction, or acknowledge fully
how prominent works sometimes deviated from the New Deal/Great Society
orthodoxy. Henry Hart and Robert Bork differed in significant ways, as did

3. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? (1994);
Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233 (1989); Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988).
4. MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1 (2015). Grand constitutional theorists include Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, John
Hart Ely, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork, and Henry Hart.
5. THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy L. Maveety ed., 2003). Pioneers of judicial
behavior include C. Herman Pritchett, Glendon Schubert, Harold Spaeth, David Danelski, Edward
Corwin, Alpheus Thomas Mason, and Robert McCloskey.
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Robert McCloskey and Harold Spaeth. Nevertheless, with all the usual caveats about grand syntheses,6 the paragraphs below roughly capture the conceptual universe in which constitutional thought occurred during the New
Deal and Great Society.
Robert McCloskey and Herbert Wechsler, whose works betray little or
no awareness of the other despite their respective prominence in law and political science, each elaborated a common institutional division of labor that
structured constitutional investigation in their disciplines. Politics was an
arena for policymaking and interest group bargaining. Law was the site for
working out fundamental regime principles or reasoned elaboration in the
“forum of principle.”7 McCloskey, a distinguished professor of political science at Harvard, in his classic The American Supreme Court maintained that
elected officials represented the democratic commitments of constitutional
democracy, while Justices represented the constitutional commitments of
constitutional democracy. “The legislature,” he wrote,
with its power to initiate programs and policies, to respond to the
expressed interest of the public, embodied the doctrine of popular
sovereignty. The courts, generally supposed to be without will as
Hamilton said, generally revered as impartial and independent, fell
heir almost by default to the guardianship of the fundamental law.8
Wechsler, in the most cited quotation in one of the top five cited law
review articles of all time,9 proffered the same institutional functions when
maintaining that elected officials appropriately pursued expedience while
courts pursued principle. “[P]rinciples are largely instrumental as they are
employed in politics,” he declared,
instrumental in relation to results that a controlling sentiment demands at any given time. Politicians recognize this fact of life and
are obliged to trim and shape their speech and votes accordingly . . . .
. . . [But] are you not also ready to agree that something else is
called for from the courts? I put it to you that the main constituent
of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching

6. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 2–3.
7. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33 (1985).
8. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 7–8 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
6th ed. rev. 2016).
9. See Fred Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).
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judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.10
This consensus that elected officials represented democratic commitments, while judges represented constitutional commitments, explains why
constitutional thinkers during the New Deal and Great Society thought that
only judicial decisionmaking required constitutional justification. The principle of majority rule or political accountability explained why elected officials who represented the popular sovereignty commitments of American
constitutionalism could make whatever decisions they believed best facilitated their reelection. Supreme Court Justices who were not elected could
not point to the same democratic commitments when declaring laws unconstitutional. When Supreme Court decisions overturned policies adopted by
democratically elected officials, their rulings presented what Alexander
Bickel labelled the countermajoritarian difficulty. “[W]hen the Supreme
Court declares [a law] unconstitutional,” Bickel wrote, “it thwarts the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now.”11 This countermajoritarian difficulty, which was the central obsession of New Deal constitutional thought,12 could be overcome, if overcome at all, only by demonstrations that the antidemocratic decisions of the federal judiciary were a faithful
exercise of the judicial obligation to adhere to the constitutional commitments of American constitutionalism. Judicial supremacy followed from this
institutional logic. Courts had the ultimate authority to determine what the
Constitution means because courts were the only institution that had the obligation and might be expected to determine what the constitution means.
Henry Hart insisted the Supreme Court:
is predestined in the long run not only by the thrilling tradition of
Anglo-American law but also by the hard facts of its position in the
structure of American institutions to be a voice of reason, charged
with the creative function of discerning afresh and of articulating
and developing impersonal and durable principles of constitutional
law . . . .13
This demand that Justices make decisions on law rather than politics
framed the central questions of both legal and public law scholarship during

10. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
14–15 (1959).
11. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (1962).
12. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
13. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 99 (1959).
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the second half of the twentieth century. Academic lawyers asked how Justices could make decisions based on law rather than on politics. They devoted their energies to developing grand theories of constitutional interpretation that provided members of the Supreme Court with the algorithms
necessary for grounding their rulings in constitutional logics sufficient to
overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty.14 Social scientists meanwhile,
claiming to “grind no ideological axes,”15 asked whether Justices were actually making decisions based on law rather than politics. They devoted their
energies to plotting regression lines demonstrating that what law professors
claimed were legal decisions were, in fact, grounded in the same factors as
the decisions made by political actors in the rest of the constitutional system.
Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, the two leading proponents of the attitudinal
model, insisted:
the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case
vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices.
Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he
was extremely liberal.16
Wechsler and Spaeth disputed whether Justices based decisions on law or on
politics, but they shared a common understanding of law as principled, of
politics as policymaking and of the law/politics distinction.17
The study of American constitutional development was structured by
the institutional division of labor underlying the distinction between law and
politics. Constitutional history was the history of constitutional law, which
included the processes by which constitutional texts were framed and ratified.
Constitutional histories largely passed over the annexation of Texas because
those constitutional debates occurred outside the courts.18 Conventional
works led readers to believe that Americans began debating the constitutional
status of bans on slavery in American territories during the run-up to Dred

14. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 1.
15. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL xv (1993). Law professors, in turn, rarely referred to the empirical literature on courts. See
Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood and neglected
Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 314–16 (2002).
16. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).
17. Compare WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 14–15, with SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 16, at
44–114.
18. For a discussion of the constitutional debates over the annexation of Texas, see Mark A.
Graber, Settling the West: the Annexation of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase, and Bush v. Gore, in
THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM, 1803–1898, at 83 (Sanford Levinson
& Bartholomew H. Sparrow eds., 2005).
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Scott v. Sandford,19 rather than in 1820 when Congress considered the Missouri Compromise.20 Restricting constitutional history to the evolution of
Supreme Court doctrine made sense because Justices were the only persons
in the American constitutional order who made any pretense of justifying
their decisions on constitutional grounds. Ignoring Charles Fairman’s advice
that “the historian of the Court should keep his watch in the halls of Congress,
not linger within the chamber of the Court,”21 few students of American constitutional development tarried long in legislative halls, executive mansions
or public streets. The political actors in those venues, conventional wisdom
maintained, had no obligation to provide constitutional grounds for their behavior, did not provide constitutional grounds for their behavior, or, when
they provided constitutional grounds for the behavior, did so insincerely.22
Scholarship that reduced American constitutional development to the
history of constitutional law took Supreme Court decisions as the authoritative statement of American constitutional practice at any given time. Marbury v. Madison23 established the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional because Marbury was the first judicial decision holding that the
Supreme Court had the power to declare laws unconstitutional.24 Brown v.
Board of Education25 desegregated public schools because that judicial decision declared Jim Crow education unconstitutional.26 Implementation was a
problem for public policy, not for constitutional law or theory.
The role of the constitutional historian and of constitutional history,
when not purely descriptive, was to separate judicial decisions based on law
from judicial decisions based on politics.27 McCulloch v. Maryland,28 which
held that Congress had the power to incorporate a national bank, and the crucial Supreme Court decisions sustaining Roosevelt administration policies

19. 60 U.S. (19. How.) 393 (1857).
20. For the discussion of the constitutionality of banning slavery in the territories that took
place during the debates over the Missouri Compromise, see MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 121–22 (2006).
21. CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–1888, at 118 (1971).
22. See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 14–15.
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
24. See, e.g., MCCLOSKEY, supra note 8, at 25–28; WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 6–7.
25. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. See, e.g., WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 31–32.
27. Gerald Gunther admitted that his influential casebook was structured to make certain decisions appear to be natural, while others to be exercises of judicial fiat. See GERALD GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975); see also David E. Bernstein,
Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1518–21 (2005) (describing changes to Gunther’s presentation of Lochner over time).
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
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and practices during the New Deal29 were good decisions because they were
based on sound constitutional reasons.30 Dred Scott v. Sandford and Lochner
v. New York31 were bad decisions because when Justices declared Congress
could not prohibit slavery in the territories or that states could not mandate
maximum hour laws for bakers, they substituted their political preferences
for the legal commands of the Constitution.32 Debate occurred over why
Brown was a legal decision and whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
v. Wade33 finding a right to an abortion in the Fourteenth Amendment was
based on law or politics.34
Rebellions within law and political science usually consisted of taking
the perspective of the other discipline. The critical legal studies movement
gained notoriety by insisting, with political scientists, that all law was politics.35 A few intrepid political scientists joined the legal quest for legitimate
modes of constitutional interpretation36 or for overcoming the countermajoritarian difficulty.37 Wallace Mendelson, a former clerk for Justice Felix
Frankfurter, a long time professor of political science at the University of
Texas, Austin, and a remarkable gentleman, was as Frankfurterian in his calls
for judicial restraint and insistence that judicial decisions be based on reasoned elaboration as any former Frankfurter clerk teaching in the legal academy.38

29. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
30. See WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 23 (“The phase of our modern constitutional development that I conceive we can most confidently deem successful inheres in the broad reading of the
commerce, taxing, and related powers of the Congress . . . .”).
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. See WECHSLER, supra note 10, at 23–24; Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 379, 381 (2011) (noting the common view that “the anticanon constitutes those decisions in
which the Court did an especially poor job of navigating and synthesizing the[] traditional (legal)
materials”).
33. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
34. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 947 (1973) (“[Roe] is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”).
35. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 1982).
36. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1991); HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994).
37. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1966).
38. See WALLACE MENDELSON, SUPREME COURT STATECRAFT: THE RULE OF LAW AND MEN
(1985).
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The Princeton school of constitutional thought,39 ably represented at
schmoozes by Jim Fleming and Linda McClain,40 provided the main alternative during the late twentieth century to this New Deal conception of the constitutional universe. The great Walter Murphy, among others, challenged
common claims that the federal judiciary enjoyed a monopoly on constitutional authority.41 Princetonians insisted that the Constitution of the United
States was more than the text ratified in 1789, as amended by the rules prescribed in Article V. They pushed constitutional thinkers in an Aristotelian
direction, incorporating what they believed was the telos of constitutionalism
and the American constitutional enterprise into constitutional theory. Richard Albert and Yaniv Roznai are working in this tradition, exploring the possibility of unconstitutional amendments, which are constitutional amendments ratified consistently with constitutional procedures that are
nevertheless inconsistent with the basic principles underlying a constitution
or constitutional democracy.42 Nevertheless, with the very important exception of Murphy’s last work,43 Princetonians largely accepted the legal emphasis of late twentieth century constitutional thinking. The very title of the
standard text of that school, American Constitutional Interpretation, articulates the common view that American constitutional theory is about what the
Constitution of the United States means44 and whether Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution bind all other political officials.
II. CRACKS IN THE NEW DEAL CONCEPTUAL UNIVERSE
Prominent schmoozers and fellow travelers by the turn of the twentyfirst century were actively undermining the New Deal conceptual universe.
Scholarship on the Constitution outside of the courts, the political construction of judicial review, and American constitutional development collapsed,
in different ways, the distinction between law and politics. Schmoozers did
so when exploring institutional divisions of labor, the nature of constitutional
39. See WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS, II, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1986).
40. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). For an excellent anthology of work by members of the
Princeton school, see CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING,
MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P. George eds., 2001).
41. See Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401 (1986).
42. See YANIV ROZNAI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: THE LIMITS
OF AMENDMENT POWERS (2017); Richard Albert, How a Court Becomes Supreme: Defending the
Constitution from Unconstitutional Amendments, 77 MD. L. REV. 181 (2017).
43. WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A
JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007).
44. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS (1984).
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decisionmaking, the justification of judicial review, constitutional authority,
and constitutional history. Howard Gillman and Keith Whittington called on
public law scholars to “‘avoid continued debate over whether judicial behavior is determined by “law” or “politics”’ and instead focus on the ‘interpenetration of law and politics and the difficulty of regarding them as either separate spheres or trying to collapse the one category into another.’”45 Some
scholar associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, most notably
Robert Gordon, began treating law as “relatively autonomous,” detailing how
legal institutions were both influenced by and influenced other political institutions.46 Rogers Smith in a series of important works on the “new institutionalism” or “historical institutionalism” called on scholars to recognize
that “legal ideologies are relatively autonomous structures with their own peculiar internal character, so that they sometimes act as independent variables
that transcend and actually help shape the content of the immediate self-interest of social groups.”47
The battle against the law/politics distinction took place on three fronts.
Works on American constitutionalism outside of courts, often inspired by the
Princeton School, exploded the notion that constitutional decisionmaking
was the unique province of the judiciary. Proponents of the political construction of judicial review detailed how Supreme Court decisions were the
consequences of elected officials empowering courts, rather than judicial efforts to impose law on politics. Students of American constitutional development reconceived the path of American constitutionalism as a struggle between proponents of different constitutional visions, rather than as contests
between law and politics.
The schmooze critique of the law/politics distinction often leans on what
might be described as a comparative “veer” in constitutional scholarship.
The scholars responsible for the New Deal conceptual universe wrote almost
exclusively on the constitutional law of the United States, often identifying
the particular elements of American constitutional democracy with the necessary elements of any constitutional democracy. Wechsler, for example,

45. Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal
Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 494 (2001) (quoting Keith E.
Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: Postbehavioralist Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 601, 629–31 (2000); see Howard Gillman, From Fundamental Law to Constitutional Politics—and Back, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 185, 185–86 (1998) (noting the contributions Judith Shklar and Stephen Griffin made to the collapse of the law/politics distinction”).
46. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).
47. Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the ‘New Institutionalism,’ and the Future of
Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 82, 98 (1988); see Rogers M. Smith, If Politics Matters: Implications for a ‘New Institutionalism’, 6 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 3–4 (1992).
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spoke about the role of law and politics in general, never hinting that a constitutional democracy might organize institutional functions differently than
the United States.48 The Constitution of the United States still occupies the
place of pride among students of the Constitution outside of the courts, the
political construction of judicial review, and constitutional development.
Nevertheless, some prominent schmoozers write primarily on comparative
constitutionalism.49 Others have published major works on comparative constitutionalism.50 Most do little more than dabble on constitutional matters
outside of the United States,51 but almost all schmoozers are far more aware
of, and are more likely to take into account the work of, at least a few comparative constitutionalism scholars than were members of the previous generation of constitutional scholars in the United States.
The Princeton School laid the foundation for challenging the New Deal
conceptual universe by questioning the judicial monopoly on constitutional
interpretation and authority, pointing to a long tradition in American politics
of prominent presidents, most notably Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, who raised questions about the judicial power to determine for the entire regime what constitutional provisions
mean.52 Sanford Levinson’s Constitutional Faith pushed the envelope further. Levinson identified a “Protestant” strand in American constitutionalism, one in which all Americans, from Supreme Court Justices to ordinary
citizens, engaged in independent constitutional interpretation. Rather than

48. See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 14–20.
49. See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009); LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY
AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007); RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE
RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2014); GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN,
CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY (2010); DIANA KAPISZEWSKI, HIGH COURTS AND ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL (2012); David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining
Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012); Kim Lane Scheppele,
Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence
Through Negative Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296 (2003).
50. See, e.g., ROGERS M. SMITH, STORIES OF PEOPLEHOOD: THE POLITICS AND MORALS OF
POLITICAL MEMBERSHIP (2003); MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL
REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008); Mila
Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657 (2016).
51. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics in the Active Voice, in CONSEQUENTIAL
COURTS: NEW JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 363 (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds.,
2013); Gordon Silverstein, Sequencing the DNA of Comparative Constitutionalism: A Thought Experiment, 65 MD. L. REV. 49 (2006).
52. See supra text accompanying notes 41, 43. Louis Fisher and Neal Devins also wrote seminal works examining the constitution outside of the courts. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER,
THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2004); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES:
INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988).
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discuss how constitutional authorities should interpret the Constitution, Levinson’s volume meditated on why and whether one should be faithful to the
Constitution. By shifting the focus of American constitutional thought, Levinson highlighted important constitutional questions that only tangentially
concerned Supreme Court Justices, such as what immigrants (or Presidents)
affirmed when they promised to be faithful (or loyal) to the Constitution.53
Keith Whittington’s Constitutional Construction further elaborated on American constitutionalism outside of the courts by detailing numerous constitutional debates, such as the debates over protective tariffs and standards for
impeaching presidents, that took place without substantial or any judicial input.54 Whittington insisted that elected officials appropriately rely on different justificatory constitutional logics than elected officials. Elected officials
construe the Constitution, relying on sources external to the text when resolving constitutional ambiguities and silences. Justices interpret the Constitution, limiting their inquiries to matters entirely within the text.55
Other scholars recognized that participants in political movements are
constitutional actors with constitutional agendas. Jack Balkin and Reva
Siegel investigated the influence of social movements on First Amendment
and equal protection law. They concluded that “[w]hen movements succeed
in contesting the application of constitutional principles, they can help
change the social meaning of constitutional principles and the practices they
regulate.”56 Bruce Ackerman detailed how Martin Luther King, Jr. and the
civil rights movement, Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme Court, and
Lyndon Johnson and the Congress of the United States were equal participants in the process that made Brown v. Board of Education the central pillar
of contemporary American constitutionalism.57 Mariah Zeisberg used Frederick Douglass as a case study when she examined the distinctive processes
by which American citizens engage in constitutional exegesis. “The work of
citizens,” she wrote, should “be not to represent the positions of others but
rather to generate public conceptions of the document that are more praiseworthy, from a justice point of view, than the conceptions that they received.”58 An important strain in the literature on the Constitution outside of
53. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (2011).
54. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 72–157 (1999).
55. See id.; see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999).
56. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 927, 929 (2006).
57. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
58. Mariah Zeisberg, Frederick Douglass, Citizen Interpreter 37 (April 2, 2010),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1583683.
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the courts developed new histories of twentieth century constitutional liberalism. Laura Weinrib, Risa Goluboff, and George Lovell detailed the different conceptions of free speech, racial equality, and civil liberties that lawyers
and ordinary citizens articulated during the first half of the twentieth century,
as well as the constitutional politics inside, but mostly outside, the courts that
tamed more radical interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.59 William Forbath is documenting a “social citizenship tradition,”
which “centered on decent work and livelihoods, social provision, and a
measure of economic independence and democracy.” 60 Proponents of social
citizenship created a “majoritarian tradition, addressing [their] arguments to
lawmakers and citizens, not to courts.”61
Contemporary works on the Constitution outside of the courts highlight
how the Constitution on the ground looks far different from that proffered by
the New Deal conceptual universe that saw only the Constitution inside the
courts. Gerald Rosenberg famously concluded that the law in action on such
matters as race and abortion often did not even bear a family resemblance to
the official constitutional law of the land.62 Scholars who disagreed with
Rosenberg’s conclusion that litigation was a poor means for seeking constitutional change nevertheless recognized that judicial decisions rarely, if ever,
reconfigure the constitutional universe in their own image.63 In many circumstances, constitutional development occurs when the Supreme Court is
offstage. Steven Griffin’s Long Wars and the Constitution documents the
fundamental changes in the constitutional balance of powers between the
President and Congress over foreign policy that have taken place over the last
seventy years, despite the absence of any Supreme Court decision on such
matters as the constitutional authority of the President to order military action
overseas without congressional approval.64 Constitutional rules have a different structure when we evaluate the interactions between the elected
branches of government. Mariah Zeisberg’s War Powers suggests that what
matters in a separation of powers analysis is that each elected branch of government brings its distinctive virtues to bear on a national problem. She
maintains that constitutional processes should not be strangled by the fixed

59. See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007); GEORGE I. LOVELL,
THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS TALK IN 1939 AMERICA (2012); LAURA
WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES COMPROMISE (2016).
60. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999).
61. Id.
62. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
63. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
64. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
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legal rules better suited to regulating such matters as when Congress may
regulate free speech than such matters as when Congress may delegate power
to the president.65
A related strand of analysis, best described as “American constitutionalism outside the federal courts,” by adding state constitutions and state
courts into the mix, demonstrates far greater diversity in the American constitutional experience than that captured by a conceptual universe limited to
studying the Supreme Court of the United States. Levinson, in Framed:
America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Government, observes that
many truisms of American constitutionalism are truisms only with respect to
federal constitutions. State constitutions, he points out, change frequently,
routinely require judicial elections, and often elect different members of the
executive branch separately. None of these deviations have led to the untoward consequences predicted by an inherited constitutional theory that treats
the Constitution of the United States as the sole expression of American constitutional thought and touchstone for best constitutional practices.66 Emily
Zackin points out how American state constitutions routinely include positive
rights, such as rights to certain public services, that are absent from the Constitution of the United States. She argues that “Americans have a long tradition of enshrining positive rights in constitutions, but that we must look at
state constitutional politics to find them.”67 Zackin and Mila Versteeg highlight how state constitutions, like those of other democracies, are far more
detailed and far more likely to be either replaced or amended.68 John Dinan
maintains that state officials are often more protective of constitutional rights
than judges.69 He describes the hundreds of state constitutional conventions
held over the past two-hundred years that have served as vehicles for incorporating new visions of governance into fundamental law.70

65. See MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
(2013); see also, SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE
ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES (1998).
66. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF
GOVERNANCE (2012).
67. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 11 (2013).
68. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81
U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1666–68, 1679–81 (2014).
69. See JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND
JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998); see also JOHN DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS: GOVERNING BY AMENDMENT IN THE AMERICAN STATES (forthcoming 2018) (discussing
the role of state constitutional amendments in the process of constitutional governance). G. Alan
Tarr deserves special mention as the father of contemporary studies on state constitutions. See, e.g.,
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998).
70. See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2006).
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Scholarship documenting the political construction of judicial power integrated constitutional developments inside and outside the courts. Howard
Gillman, Keith Whittington, Paul Frymer, George Lovell, and many others
relate how constitutional actors outside of courts have consistently sought to
empower the federal judiciary in order to secure their constitutional ambitions.71 Gillman describes how the Judiciary Acts of 1875 and 1891 helped
fashion a Republican controlled judiciary that declared unconstitutional state
interferences with national markets and sharply restricted the power of labor
unions.72 Frymer discusses how the Democratic Party, during the 1960s,
foisted on to courts disputes over the racial integration of unions that badly
divided two crucial members of that coalition, both union members of color.73
Lovell writes about how Congress during the early twentieth century empowered courts to make antitrust law and determine the legal status of labor unions through vague statutory language that invited judges to make public policy in the guise of statutory interpretation.74 Whittington details how
Presidents routinely endorse judicial supremacy when confronted with a hostile or paralyzed legislature.75
Judicial review is as politically constructed in other constitutional democracies. Nadiv Mordechay and Yaniv Roznai observe that elected official
may facilitate judicial authority by inaction as well as action. They state,
“[T]he anti-majoritarian judicial defense of rights and freedoms was established in Israel through a tacit political consent. For various reasons the Basic
Laws on Human Rights have not been repealed, and the Knesset, in fact, accepted the idea that it has constitutional limits . . . .”76

71. For reviews of this literature, see Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 425 (2005); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to
Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361 (2008); see also Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV.
35 (1993).
72. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 516–17 (2002).
73. See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT,
AND THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (2008); Paul Frymer, Acting when Federal Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Enforcement in U.S. Labor Unions 1935–85, 97 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 483 (2003).
74. See GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL
POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003).
75. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007).
76. Nadiv Mordechay & Yaniv Roznai, A Jewish and (Declining) Democratic State? Constitutional Retrogression in Israel, 77 MD. L. REV. 244, 250–51 (2017) (citing Ori Aronson, Why
Hasn’t the Knesset Repealed Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty? On the Status Quo as Counter
Majoritarian Difficulty, 37 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. 509 (2016)).
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Courts in constitutional politics neither steal issues from election officials nor serve as mere agents for dominant majorities, but are one of many
sites for political contests over what constitutional visions shall be the official
law of the land. Ran Hirschl’s hegemonic preservation thesis maintains that
coalitions that fear losing their grip of electoral power, from the Federalists
in 1800 to the Labor Party in Israel at the turn of the twenty-first century,
often seek to empower judiciaries in order to maintain their influence over
political and constitutional affairs. “[W]hen their policy preferences have
been, or are likely to be, increasingly challenged in majoritarian decisionmaking arenas,” Hirschl asserts, “elites that possess disproportionate access
to, and influence over, the legal arena may initiate a constitutional entrenchment of rights and judicial review in order to transfer power to supreme
courts.”77
Judicial empowerment may fail or be partly successful. Mordechay and
Roznai note that the democratic project of the Israeli Supreme Court has not
fully come to fruition because of an inadequate underlying constitutional politics. The justices and their allies have incompletely liberalized Israeli constitutional politics because “the supervisory capacity of the parliament” was
not fully developed and “the constitutional ethos in the public sphere” was
not “strengthen[ed].”78 Powerful courts are relatively, but not completely
autonomous institutions. Tom Keck points out that American Justices in a
wide variety of cases cannot be classified as acting purely as umpires who
put law over politics, purely as tyrants who impose their policy preferences
on the body public, or purely as sideshows who blindly incorporate the dominant party’s preferences into law.79
Scholarship on the political construction of judicial review subverts the
law/politics distinction that structured the New Deal conceptual universe. Judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional does not present a countermajoritarian difficulty when that authority is established by legislative acts, such
as the Judiciary Act of 1789, which explicitly authorized federal courts to
strike down federal and state legislation,80 rather than judicial decisions, such
as Marbury v. Madison.81 The generation of scholars who worried about the
democratic status of such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education, as Kevin
McMahon details, wasted a good fuss. The foundations of that ruling were
laid as much by decisions made by the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower
77. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 (2004).
78. Mordechay & Roznai, supra note 76, at 268.
79. THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES (2014).
80. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 85–86.
81. See Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789,
38 TULSA L. REV. 609, 610 (2003).
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administrations to staff the federal courts with racial liberals as by the series
of judicial decisions that undermined Plessy v. Ferguson82 and Jim Crow in
public education.83 Barry Friedman’s five-part history of the countermajoritarian difficulty insisted that public concern with the democratic credentials
of judicial power throughout American history varies with the constitutional
politics of particular eras and is not a constant feature of the American constitutional regime.84 Friedman identified the following:
[F]our factors that explain from a historical perspective when
countermajoritarian criticism of the courts is likely to emerge.…
(a) the extent to which judicial decisions are unpopular with a
group substantial enough to be able to claim to speak for “the people”; (b) whether such decisions are rendered at a time when public
sentiment favors a relatively popular or direct form of democracy;
(c) whether at the time such decisions are rendered there is relative
faith in the determinacy of judicial interpretations of the Constitution; and (d) whether such decisions are rendered during a period
of judicial supremacy.85
Proponents of the political construction of judicial power explore why
elected officials empower courts rather than the conditions under which
courts may thwart the will of elected officials. Levinson and Balkin see
courts as sites for partisan entrenchment. “Parties who control the presidency
install jurists of their liking,” they declare, who “in turn create decisions
which are embodied in constitutional doctrine and continue to have influence
long after those who nominated and confirmed the jurists have left office.”86
Ginsburg maintains that politicians drafting a constitutionally constructed judicial review is a form of political insurance.87 Justin Crowe’s history of the
federal legislation that first created, and then expanded, the federal judiciary
82. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
83. See KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004). For decisions undermining Jim Crow in public education, see
especially, McLaurin v. Okla. St. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
84. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998) [hereinafter Friedman, Road to Judicial
Supremacy]; Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lessons of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry
Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficult, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 971 (2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
85. Friedman, Road to Judicial Supremacy, supra note 84, at 342.
86. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045, 1076 (2001).
87. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES 18 (2003).
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finds that elected officials throughout American history actively sought powerful courts partly to secure certain policy goals, partly to satisfy certain patronage needs, and partly because of commitments to a well-functioning and
partly independent judicial system.88
Politically constructed judicial power presents challenges to constitutional democracy that the countermajoritarian difficulty does not capture.
George Lovell and Scott Lemieux worry that judicial review may enable
elected officials to hide their responsibility for contested judicial decisions.89
Gordon Silverstein worries that judicial review may result in incoherent policy, as for example, when the Justices in Buckley v. Valeo90 declared unconstitutional parts, but not all, of a federal campaign spending law that Congress
designed to be a coherent whole.91 Another strand of this scholarship treats
judicial review as one of the many veto points that exist in American constitutional politics. Lemieux and David Watkins insist that politically constructed judicial review serves the democratic goal of preventing domination
better than other veto points, such as the filibuster. Acknowledging the
“complicated relationship between constitutional courts and other political
actors,” they conclude, “judicial review is a relatively attractive veto point
from a democracy-against-domination standpoint.”92
Students of American constitutional development opened up another
front in the war against the law/politics distinction by finding more fruitful
ways of looking at constitutional history than distinguishing bad political decisions from good legal decisions.93 Rogers Smith’s seminal Liberalism and
American Constitutional Law explored how American constitutional law
could be understood as contests over different ways of working out a liberal

88. See JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012).
89. See George I. Lovell & Scott E. Lemieux, Assessing Juristocracy: Are Judges Rulers or
Agents?, 65 MD. L. REV. 100, 113 (2006).
90. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
91. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES,
AND KILLS POLITICS 152–74 (2009).
92. SCOTT E. LEMIEUX & DAVID J. WATKINS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND CONTEMPORARY
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: POWER, DOMINATION AND THE COURTS 2–4 (2017).
93. For other schmooze classics of American constitutional development not discussed here
purely for space reasons, see STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF POLITICAL
CHANGE (2014); ELVIN T. LIM, THE LOVERS’ QUARREL: THE TWO FOUNDINGS AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (2014); GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE RISE AND FALL OF GENERATIONAL REGIMES (2007); ROBERT L. TSAI,
AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONS: DEFIANT VISIONS OF POWER AND COMMUNITY (2014).
For my works in this tradition, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE
AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); GRABER, supra note 20.
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tradition.94 Over time, Smith concluded that much of American constitutional development was a struggle between, as well as a complex amalgam
of, liberal, republican, and ascriptive traditions, the latter of which regarded
American identity as rooted in certain characteristics, such as race, that are
established at birth.95 Rather than classify judicial decisions by the extent to
which they were rooted in political will or legal logic, Smith classified judicial decisions in light of their affinity with different strands of the American
constitutional tradition. Howard Gillman documented how the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York, often regarded as the poster-child
for political decisionmaking, was rooted in jurisprudential traditions that
dated from the founding. All the Justices on the Lochner Court, he explained,
engaged in making law because they were committed to elaborating the constitutional text in light of past precedents and longstanding traditions. All the
Justices on the Lochner Court were also engaged in politics because how they
interpreted the constitutional text in light of past precedents and longstanding
traditions depended on their idiosyncratic values and policy preferences.96
American constitutional development, as works in the schmooze tradition elaborate, is a consequence of complex dialogues between courts, elected
officials, and non-governmental political actors, rather than the study of judicial solos. Eric Lomazoff’s forthcoming book on the constitutional status
of the national bank in the early republic details how McCulloch was partly
the product of changing federal and state banking practices, partly the product
of the changing constitutional understandings of the National Republican majority in Congress, and partly the product of longstanding Marshall Court interpretations of federal powers.97 John Compton documents how nineteenth
century evangelical movements, while seeking to ban lotteries and prohibit
drinking, provided the constitutional foundations for the New Deal state.98
Kenneth Kersch explores how the constitutional meaning of the Fourth
Amendment changed as the conventional subject of a contested search
evolved from businesspersons to bootleggers to persons of color.99 In many
94. See ROGERS M. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1990).
95. See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S.
HISTORY (1997).
96. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993).
97. ERIC LOMAZOFF, A TALE OF TWO CLAUSES: RECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS OF NATIONAL BANKING, 1791–1832 (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5) (on file with
author).
98. See JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION
(2014).
99. See KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129–133 (2004).
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instances, what Ronald Kahn describes as a “mutual construction process”
exists, whereby political developments influence how federal justices interpret the constitutional universe, and those interpretations, in turn, reshape the
rest of American politics.100 Pamela Brandwein considers how Democratic/conservative Republican understandings of Reconstruction, inside and
outside of the federal judiciary, influenced what materials later scholars
thought relevant to determining the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which in turn influenced how the Supreme Court interpreted
that text. Her work describes the “impact . . . on Warren Court arguments
about legislative apportionment” of “history’s production—as built mostly
by Northern Democratic congressmen in 1866, reconstituted by the Supreme
Court in the 1870s, and validated by [the legal historian] Charles Fairman in
the 1950s.”101
These new constitutional histories collapse the law/politics distinction
underlying Herbert Wechsler’s call for judicial decisions based on neutral
principles, as well as the attitudinal model’s claim that Justices make decisions on the basis of policy preferences rather than on the legal basis of the
law. Smith’s analysis of the impact of liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptivism on American constitutional development highlights how political and
legal variables are inevitably intertwined in legal decisions in ways that cannot be neatly disentangled. Inherited political science models, as I have
pointed out, have difficulty classifying judicial decisions to follow past legal
precedents, such as the judicial decision in Ex parte McCardle,102 when those
precedents were initially based on strategic or policy considerations. “The
legal roads” to most decisions, that work concludes, are “paved by a legal,
strategic, and attitudinal mixture,” no element of which “can easily be isolated.”103
Schmoozers, nevertheless, treat courts as distinctive political institutions, not distinct from the rest of a homogenized political universe, but distinctive in the sense that the Federal Elections Commission, Republican
Party, and Des Moines School Board are also distinctive political institutions.
As Carol Nackenoff notes in a contribution to a past schmooze, “The Court
has its own norms, dynamics, and institutional history; it has doctrine, rules,

100. Ronald Kahn, The Commerce Clause and Executive Power: Exploring Nascent Individual
Rights in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 73 MD. L. REV. 133, 143 (2013).
101. PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 3 (2001).
102. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
103. Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy: Deciding to Decide during the Civil
War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33,
60 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
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precedents, metaphors, and language peculiar to it.”104 Some studies in
American constitutional development highlight how law slows the implementation of policy preferences. Elizabeth Bussiere details how Warren
Court Justices, committed to greater economic equality, did not have the legal
time necessary to establish the precedents that might have eventually led to
decisions declaring constitutional rights to basic necessities.105 Julie Novkov
explains how Supreme Court decisions in the 1930s that freed legislatures to
regulate the bargaining process between employers and employees106 provided doctrinal foundations for judicial decisions restricting women in the
economic marketplace107 long after the progressive justifications for those
restrictions had vanished. “Protection was won at the expense of the recognition of women’s full citizenship,” she asserts, and was maintained “long
after it was a valuable tool for women.”108
Legal institutions influence how policy preferences are formed and implemented. Life tenure and legality matter. Tom Keck demonstrates that
Republican and Democratic judicial appointees on the federal bench vote differently than their political sponsors in the White House and Congress.109
Leslie Goldstein’s exhaustive study of American racial politics concludes
that Justices are more likely than elected officials to protect the rights of racial minorities. She writes, “[T]he Court has, within the strictures created by
the Constitution, acted to protect rights of one or another racial minority
group to a greater degree than the elected branches have been willing to
do.”110
III. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
These schmooze projects are united by a commitment to constitutional
politics rather than the separation between law and politics. Constitutionalism, in a conceptual universe developed by schmoozers, is a system of gov-

104. Carol Nackenoff, Is There a Political Tilt to ‘Juristocracy’?, 65 MD. L. REV. 139, 149
(2006).
105. See ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE
RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997).
106. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
107. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
108. JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN: GENDER, LAW AND
LABOR IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND NEW DEAL YEARS 271, 272 (2001).
109. See KECK, supra note 79; Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme
Court Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321 (2007).
110. LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES: TWO
CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL 399 (2017). Professor Goldstein has graciously published some of her work on race in this symposium. See Leslie Goldstein, An Unacknowledged
Constitutional Crisis: United States v. Shipp II (1909), 77 MD. L. REV. 200 (2017).
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ernance that integrates law and politics. Matters conventionally deemed politics influence the course of American constitutionalism. Likewise, matters
conventionally deemed legal influence the course of partisan politics. Good
constitutional orders foster appropriate interactions between law and politics
and do not construct impenetrable barriers between the two.
The path of constitutional law frequently intersects with the path of partisan politics, even though the two roads do not run fully parallel to each
other. Both the Taney and Chase Courts reflected the Jacksonian proclivities
of the Supreme Court Justices appointed between 1828 and 1860.111 During
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, when competition between two
non-ideological parties structured American politics, Supreme Court decision making was generally consistent with the views of a bipartisan elite.112
Howard Gillman, Susan Lawrence, and Charles Epp point out how the liberalism of the Warren Court was partly rooted in congressional decisions that
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal court system and provided substantial
support for liberal litigation campaigns.113 Eliminate congressional funding
for the Legal Services Corporation, and such cases as Goldberg v. Kelly,114
which provided a hearing for welfare recipients before government officials
could terminate their benefits, probably would not come before the Supreme
Court.
Basic features of American politics reflect underlying constitutional
structures and decisions. Candidates for the presidency camp out in a few
swing states, ignoring large metropolitan areas, such as New York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., because the Electoral College
awards victories based on gaining the most votes in individual states rather
than gaining the most votes throughout the United States.115 Change the constitutional rules for electing the president, and how candidates conduct electoral campaigns will change. Lisa Miller’s recent The Myth of Mob Rule:
Violent Crime & Democratic Politics details how the policies that explain
111. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 77–93 (5th ed. rev. 2008); Mark
A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, 25 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 17 (2000).
112. See Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conflict, 50 IND.
L. REV. 141, 160–67 (2016).
113. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990); HOWARD
GILLMAN, Party Politics and Constitutional Change: The Political Origins of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 103, at
138.
114. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
115. See Two-Thirds of Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE (last
visited Nov. 14, 2017), http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016.
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different imprisonment rates among countries are highly sensitive to the
structure of constitutional institutions. Parliamentary systems, she details,
tend to be more concerned with prevention. In contrast, the American presidential system generates more concern with punishment.116 The Supreme
Court’s decisions in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke117 and
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber118 help explain why Fortune 500
companies became more committed to diversity during the last decades of
the twentieth century, which, in turn, helps explain why the Supreme Court
in Grutter v. Bollinger119 reaffirmed Bakke’s support for using race in university admissions processes.120
Constitutional politics are dynamic. Struggles take place across the political universe over the language for discussing fundamental regime commitments, the places where such commitments may be discussed, the institutions with the authority to at least temporarily settle constitutional
controversies, and persons who occupy privileged positions in those institutions. Chief Justice John Marshall captured an important truth when he asserted that the Constitution of the United States was “intended to endure for
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.”121 He nevertheless failed to acknowledge or foresee the deeply partisan processes by which those formal, semi-formal, and informal constitutional changes occur.122
Constitutions in the schmooze world view are devices that constitute
politics rather than means for regulating politics from above. Constitutions
create languages for talking about fundamental regime commitments.123
Americans debate whether the death penalty is “cruel and unusual punishment[]”124 and whether requiring persons to buy health insurance “regulate[s]
Commerce . . . among the several States.”125 Constitutions create places for
discussing and settling fundamental political commitments. The First
116. See LISA L. MILLER, THE MYTH OF MOB RULE: VIOLENT CRIME AND DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS (2016).
117. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
118. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
119. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
120. See MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 238–
39 (2013).
121. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
122. For a discussion of the processes of formal, semi-formal and informal constitutional
change, see GRABER, supra note 120, at 140–73.
123. See HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (2007); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY 195, 237 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988).
124. U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
125. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Amendment gives all citizens the right to petition the national government
on constitutional and other matters.126 Article III creates a judiciary with jurisdiction over “all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution.”127 Constitutions grant some people privileged positions in constitutional controversies:
Federal Justices adjudicate cases raising constitutional matters. Presidents
have the power to veto laws they believe unconstitutional.
Constitutional politics consistently alters the language for discussing
fundamental regime commitments. Political movements have not struggled
to change the literal constitutional text. Republicans in 1868 successfully
added a textual commitment to equality that changed how Americans discussed the rights of persons of color and the rights of business corporations.128 The women’s suffrage movement successfully added a textual right
to vote that changed how Americans debated whether women could serve on
juries.129 And political movements influence constitutional conversations
even when they do not change the constitutional text. When Americans in
the twenty-first century debate the constitutional meaning of racial equality,
they often spend more energy discussing the meaning of Brown v. Board of
Education than the meaning of the post-Civil War Amendments.130 Jamal
Greene details the exceptional influence of the marketing campaign devoted
to selling originalism as the primary means for constitutional interpretation.131
Similar struggles between political actors and political movements take
place over what places shall have a privileged position in the constitutional
order and who shall occupy those places. Much of constitutional politics
consists of partisan efforts to empower those institutions that particular political movements believe they are most likely to control or influence for the
foreseeable future. Antebellum southerners fought for state rights on matters
they believed that states would make pro-slavery policies and for national
power on matters they believed the national government more likely to make
pro-slavery policies.132 “A broad generalization, inaccurate only at the margins,” Mark Tushnet maintains,
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
127. Id. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
128. See Santa Clara Cty. v. So. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
129. See People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 150 N.E. 290 (Ill. 1925); People v. Bartlz, 180 N.W.
423 (Mich. 1920).
130. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746–48
(2007); id. at 772–80 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 799–803 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 864–
68 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 939, 1004–06 (2008)
131. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009).
132. See Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitution Doctrine, 1846–1860, 54 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 117 (1961).
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is that nearly every constitutional theorist urges minimal judicial
review and vigorous democratic dialogue on issues on which the
theorist believes her preferred position is likely to prevail in the
democratic dialogue and more-than-minimal review on issues on
which the theorist believes her preferred position is unlikely to prevail there.133
Whittington details how presidents promote judicial supremacy when
they believe that the federal judiciary is more sympathetic to their constitutional vision than Congress.134 Political actors and movements as aggressively seek to change the persons who occupy the privileged positions in the
American constitutional universe. Presidential candidates routinely tout their
pro-life or pro-choice credentials. When elected, they appoint Justices and
other government officials who broadly share their commitment to making a
particular constitutional vision the official law of the land.
Participants in constitutional politics have multiple identities. The New
Deal conceptual universe divided political actors into judges and elected officials.135 This obsession with institutional affiliation discounted how partisan commitments, policy preferences, and personal identities exercise independent influence on constitutional behavior. That Ruth Bader Ginsburg is
a Supreme Court Justice, a proponent of gender equality, a Democrat, and a
white, Jewish woman all help explain why she favors judicial supremacy,136
insists on a high degree of scrutiny for gender classifications,137 opposes
Christian prayers to open public meetings,138 and is unlikely to retire while
Donald Trump is President. A complete explanation of Donald Trump’s constitutional actions, in turn, requires taking into account that he was the successful Republican candidate for the presidency, that he is a businessperson
with an affinity for the alt-Right, and that Trump is a white male with limited
religious convictions.139

133. Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic Debilitation: Comparative Illumination
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 245–46 n.4 (1995).
134. WHITTINGTON, supra note 75; see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS viii (1981) (describing courts as institutions “by which central political regimes consolidate their control over the countryside”).
135. Or, more accurately, judges and everyone else.
136. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
137. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
138. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
139. See, e.g., Eli Stokols, Trump Fires up the Alt-Right, POLITICO (Oct. 13, 2015),
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/donald-trump-full-breitbart-229767; Daniel Burke, The
Guilt-Free Gospel of Donald Trump, CNN (Oct. 24, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/21/politics/trump-religion-gospel/index.html.
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IV. FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO THE WORKING
CONSTITUTION
Constitutional politics studies how constitutions work rather than what
constitutional provisions mean. Schmoozers explore what people are doing
or trying to do when they alter constitutional language, make constitutional
arguments, and engage in numerous other forms of constitutional politics.
Constitutional interpretation is central to these enterprises. Constitutional
designers declare that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,”140 or “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,”141 because they believe those texts have
particular meanings. How constitutional authorities interpret the words “nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”142 determines whether certain criminals are executed for their crimes. Nevertheless, constitutional framers recognize that parchment barriers are insufficient to fashion a constitutional order.143 The persons responsible for creating, maintaining and modifying
constitutions are constructing entire regimes, not merely limiting government.
Constitutional framers when creating regimes perform various tasks.
Framers design institutions that foster constitutional fidelity. What the framers were doing when they mandated life tenure for members of the federal
judiciary, Federalist 78 claims, was facilitating the appointment of persons
with “sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the station of judges.”144
Many constitutional purposes cannot be achieved solely by words. A clause
that forbade the president from appointing major generals whose “military
knowledge, though plucky and adventury, has only been brought down to the
beginning of the century”145 is likely to be ineffective unless the President
has the capacity and will to appoint competent military commanders. What
the framers were doing when designing the system for electing the President,
Federalist 68 points out, was increasing the “probability of seeing the station
filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue.”146 Rather than provide fixed limits on government, constitutional framers may be more concerned to guarantee, to the extent humanly possible, that persons with certain

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. amend. VIII.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 479 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
This is, of course, the patter song from Pirates of Penzance. WILLIAM S. GILBERT &
ARTHUR SULLIVAN, PIRATES OF THE PENZANCE: I AM THE VERY MODEL OF A MODERN MAJORGENERAL (1879), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X—ngR15_JM.
146. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 144, at 416 (Alexander Hamilton).
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capacities, values, and interests are responsible for implementing particular
constitutional provisions. What Thaddeus Stevens was doing when he fought
for the Fourteenth Amendment was “secur[ing] [the] perpetual ascendancy
[of] the party of the Union [i.e., the Republican Party]” as the coalition that
would be responsible for protecting the rights and exercising the powers enumerated by the Thirteenth Amendment.147
The successors to constitutional framers perform similar tasks. They
must ensure that institutions under changing circumstances continue to foster
constitutional fidelity, generate leaders with the capacity to make intelligent
policy, and privilege government by persons who represent the right combination of capacities, values and interests to achieve vital constitutional commitments. What Democrats in the Jacksonian Era were doing when they
adopted supermajority rules for selecting the party’s nominee for the presidency was ensuring the selection of persons sensitive to slaveholding interests.148 What Congress was doing during the Great Society by attaching various legislative vetoes to legislation delegating power was trying to retain
some control over executive and administrative policymaking.149
Constitutions work by constraining politics, constructing politics, and
constituting politics.150 Constitutions constrain politics when citizens,
elected officials and Justices do not champion what they would otherwise
believe are desirable policies because they believe those policies are unconstitutional or because the Supreme Court has declared those policies unconstitutional. James Madison vetoed a roads and canals bill he thought efficacious because he thought the federal government was not constitutionally
authorized to sponsor internal improvements.151 Justice Felix Frankfurter refused to declare unconstitutional policies that violated his core commitments
to free speech.152
Constitutions construct politics by aggregating interests, values, and
policy preferences in ways that privilege certain outcomes. State equality in
the Senate helps explain why Wyoming gets a higher share of transit funds

147. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1865).
148. See GRABER, supra note 20, at 148.
149. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967–74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
150. This paragraph largely summarizes GRABER, supra note 120, at 212–49.
151. 30 ANNALS OF CONG. 211–12 (1817).
152. See, e.g., W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646–47 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (“Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should whole-heartedly associate myself with the general libertarian views in the Court’s opinion, representing as they do the thought
and action of a lifetime.”).
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(and anti-terrorist funds) per capita than New York.153 The American political system polarized during the 1850s and is polarized at present in part because the Constitution mandates an electoral system in which all members of
the national legislature are chosen in local elections.154 Americans who believe that abortion should be legal, but heavily regulated, may occupy the
political center nationally, but they are in the minority in both Utah and Massachusetts, and states are where Americans hold elections for national office.
Constitutions constitute politics by shaping values. Madison thought
that constitutional rights functioned by educating public opinion as well as
by constraining political action. He told the first Congress that the parchment
declarations in a bill of rights would have “a tendency to impress some degree
of respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse
the attention of the whole community.”155 Americans favor presidential systems primarily because they are socialized to appreciate the merits of presidential systems. When white supremacists seek permits to hold rallies,
Americans have been conditioned to ask whether the First Amendment protects hate speech. Persons raised in a different constitutional order think
some other question better frames the relevant issues.156
Students of constitutional politics are especially concerned with the conditions under which constitutional democracy works and the conditions under
which constitutional democracy might work better. By looking at how an
entire regime generates and realizes particular constitutional visions,
schmoozers go beyond the New Deal obsession with an independent judiciary that declares laws unconstitutional as the necessary and sufficient condition for a good constitutional order. Stephen Griffin’s essay in this symposium examines such elements of a constitutional order as “the structure of
state institutions, political parties trying to run the Constitution in a polarized
environment, the technological elites who staff the state, and the political
trust required to keep the rickety train of government on track.”157 Stephen
Elkin provides a better framework for both empirical and normative work
when observing that a constitutional order consists of commitments to certain

153. See FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL
CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1999).
154. See GRABER, supra note 20, at 161–63.
155. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 455 (1789).
156. For comparative perspectives on free speech, see RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH (2006).
157. Stephen M. Griffin, Trump, Trust and the Future of the Constitutional Order, 77 MD. L.
REV. 161, 162 (2017). For a discussion of constitutional orders, see STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 68–87 (1996). See also MARK
TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003).
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values, institutions designed to achieve those values, and a people who share
a commitment to those values and are capable of operating the relevant institutions.158 Constitutions work when the relevant values, institutions and people align. Constitutional crises, “constitutional retrogression,”159 or what
Jack Balkin calls “constitutional rot” occur when the constitutional order becomes “disharmonic.”160 One dimension of the constitutional order conflicts
with or undermines other dimensions. During the years before the Civil War,
governing institutions designed to facilitate compromises among sections increasingly privileged the election of sectional extremists.161 Immediately after the Civil War, constitutional commitments to racial equality conflicted
with increased elite commitments to federalism and scientific racism.162
The Federalist Papers outlines at length some broader constitutional
phenomena necessary for maintaining a constitutional republic. James Madison and Alexander Hamilton were particularly concerned with the character
of the political leadership class. They celebrated the institutions established
by the Constitution of the United States for their capacity to generate governing officials who were committed to constitutional values, had the capacity
to pursue such constitutional goals as the general welfare and common defense, and were sufficiently diverse to represent the entire country. Federalist 57 declares that every political constitution should strive above all “to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to
pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to
hold their public trust.”163 Federalist 10, as opposed to Federalist 2,164 emphasizes that constitutional democracy can thrive only in a diverse society.
Madison wrote, “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”165

158. See Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1933, 1948 (2001).
159. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 6), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2901776.
160. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 1 (2010); see Jack M. Balkin,
Constitutional Crisis and Consitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147 (2017).
161. See GRABER, supra note 20, at 162–63.
162. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 72–105 (1999).
163. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 144, at 347 (James Madison).
164. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 144, at 9 (John Jay) (“Providence has been pleased
to give this one connected country, to one united people—a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of
government, very similar in their manners and customs . . . .”).
165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 144, at 57 (James Madison).

2017]

THE SCHMOOZE PROJECT

137

The great democratic theorist Robert Dahl, updating Publius, concluded
that stable polyarchies, of which constitutional democracies are an important
subset, require “modern[,] dynamic pluralist societ[ies].”166 These societies
are characterized by
a relatively high level of income and wealth per capita, long-run
growth in per capita income and wealth, a high level of urbanization, a rapidly declining or relatively small agricultural population,
great occupational diversity, extensive literacy, a comparatively
large number of persons who have attended institutions of higher
education, an economic order in which production is mainly carried on by relatively autonomous firms whose decisions are
strongly oriented toward national and international markets, and
relatively high levels of conventional indicators of well-being,
such as physicians and hospital beds per thousand persons, life expectancy, infant mortality, percentage of families with various consumer durables, and so on.167
Modernity, dynamism, and pluralism each play distinctive roles fostering polyarchy and constitutional democracy. Modern societies are governed
by highly educated officials whose decisions are consistently evaluated by a
literate public. Dynamic societies are characterized by a strong and confident
middle-class whose members, during most economic times, enjoy secure jobs
and livelihoods.168 Pluralist societies are populated by citizens who have a
wide variety of economic, religious, ethnic and other identities, and these
identities are considered consistent with their full citizenship in the regime.169
Dahl concludes that this combination of modernity, dynamism and pluralism
creates political environments in which political actors “can resist unilateral
domination, compete with each other for advantages, engage in conflict and
bargaining, and pursue independent actions on their own.”170 Though regimes commonly considered to be constitutional democracies are often characterized by substantial inequalities and political exclusions.171
An admittedly creative synthesis of Publius, Dahl and various schmoozers suggest four conditions under which democratic constitutions are likely
to work.
 An intelligent and experienced leadership class that is committed to
the basic norms of constitutional democracy and engages in politics

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 251 (1989) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 252.
Thanks to Julie Novkov for reminding me of this point.
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for the purpose of serving the public rather than for celebrity or enrichment.
 A population that takes what the eighteenth century thought of as a
scientific outlook on public policy, rather than making political
choices on ideological or religious dogma. Politics is experienced
rather than faith based. The ways in which citizens acquire information exposes them to various perspectives and facilitates intelligent political decisions.
 A commitment to social pluralism. Political actors recognize that
multiple ways exist of leading the good life, being a good citizen,
and constructing a good society.172 People are encouraged to have a
wide variety of identities consistent with condition 2 and persons
with those identities are fairly represented in the political elite. Politicians committed to pluralism are able to reach the broadly accepted
compromises necessary to maintain a stable political order.
 A commitment to a fair degree of economic and social equality. Substantial class mobility exists. No social or economic class, the political class in particular, is walled off from good or bad times. No
underclass exists that is disproportionately composed of members of
identifiable groups in the population.
Variations on these themes are certainly possible. Nevertheless, the
turns from the law/politics distinction to constitutional politics and from constitutional interpretation to the working constitution focus constitutional theory far more on the composition of the political class, the nature of decisionmaking, the acceptance of social and cultural pluralism, and the roles of
social and economic class in a particular regime than on whether constitutional courts are correctly interpreting the constitutional text.173
V. THE CRISIS OF (AMERICAN) CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
The present governing crisis in the United States and throughout the
world, the schmooze project suggests, is a consequence of a weakening in
these conditions for constitutional democracy. Griffin notes that “constitutional crises [are] generated internally rather than externally,”174 by failures
of constitutional institutions operating normally to achieve desirable results
rather than by unexpected outside shocks to the political system. Independent
172. Or fashioning a good university.
173. Scholars who remain focused on the federal judiciary should nevertheless consider the
composition of the political class, the ways in which the general public makes political decisions,
the extent of social pluralism and the roles of economic and social class when explaining why they
believe courts make particular mistakes interpreting the Constitution.
174. Griffin, supra note 157, at 174.
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judiciaries remain in place, but their foundations and the foundations for
more vital conditions of constitutional democracy are crumbling. Elections
are held regularly and laws passed according to the constitutional rules, but
the “policy disasters that have occurred in recent years, including the Iraq
War and the 2008 financial crisis, suggest that something is deeply wrong
with the way the American state is organized.”175 Some prominent schmoozers look for solutions outside of constitutional politics, calling for a constitutional convention that will somehow happen without the intervention of Congress, political parties or existing political interests.176 The schmooze project
provides reasons for thinking this project both intellectually stimulating and
an escapist fantasy. While citizens in a healthy constitutional democracy
consistently ask whether constitutional institutions might be improved, problems within existing constitutional politics can be cured only by effective use
of resources within existing constitutional politics.177
The institutions and practices of constitutional democracy are weakening throughout the world, as well as in the United States. Yasmin Dawood’s
contribution to this symposium asserts that “democracy [is] in retreat across
nearly the entire globe.”178 Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg observe an “incremental (but ultimately substantial) decay in three basic predicates of democracy—competitive elections, liberal rights to speech and association, and the
adjudicative and administrative rule of law necessary for democratic choice
to thrive.”179 Both fragile and previously stable constitutional democracies
are under siege. Huq and Ginsburg observe “constitutional backsliding” in
Venezuela, Thailand, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Hungary and Poland.180 Mordechay
and Roznai document the decline of democratic commitments in Benjamin
Netanyahu’s Israel, noting “an erosion of [Israel’s] democratic institutions”
leading “to an incremental democratic backslide.”181
Citizens of constitutional democracies are increasingly likely to be governed by officials who fail to satisfy Publian, Dahlian or related standards for
175. Id. at 179.
176. See STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2015); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION:
WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
177. See Griffin, supra note 157, at 171. (“Trump himself may in time be ‘solved’ by some
constitutional process (such as impeachment), but that would not change the reality that he was
produced by the constitutional order itself.”).
178. Yasmin Dawood, The Fragility of Constitutional Democracy: Theory and Practice, 77 MD.
L. REV. 192, 194 (2017) (quoting JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT: THE REVOLT
OF THE MIDDLE CLASS AND THE WORLDWIDE DECLINE OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 10
(2014)).
179. Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 159, at 6.
180. Id. at 54 tbl. 3.
181. Mordechay & Roznai, supra note 76, at 246.
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constitutional leadership. The President of the United States is a bigot182 who
lacks every qualification for the presidency set out in the Federalist Papers,
save for being elected according to the rules set out in Article II.183 Many
Republicans and Democrats treat electoral politics as a path for enrichment
and celebrity rather than as a means for facilitating human flourishing.184
President Trump’s response to political protest, state legislation aimed at political protest, and legislation designed to reduce voting by less fortunate
Americans highlights weakening support for the practices of constitutional
democracy across the American constitutional universe.185 Leaders with a
similar absence of qualifications and democratic commitments are gaining
traction in electoral politics in other constitutional democracies.186
At a time when knowledge about matters as diverse as global warming,
globalization, and nuclear proliferation is particularly vital,187 substantial percentages of the voting population in the United States do not know basic facts
about the environment, the economy, and foreign policy.188 An influential
minority of Americans, often inspired by political or business entrepreneurs,
are particularly prone to engage in magical thinking when discounting the
scientific consensus on global warming.189 Chinn notes that “the polity is
bereft of the basic tools needed for . . . engagement” on vital political questions, such as “agreement upon basic terminology or something approaching
baseline ‘facts.’”190 The fundamental problem is the tendency to base voting
and political decisions on ideological or religious dogma rather than a dearth
of information. When ideological and religious zealots are presented with
facts inconsistent with their opinions, they cling to those opinions more

182. See Stuart Chinn, Threats to Democratic Stability: Comparing the Elections of 2016 and
1860, 77 MD. L. REV. 291 (2017); see also Griffin, supra note 157, at 161–64.
183. See Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7–12).
184. See Brian Cowan, Celebrity and Politics Before Trump, OUPBLOG (Dec. 8, 2016),
https://blog.oup.com/2016/12/celebrity-politics-before-trump/.
185. See Dawood, supra note 178, at 198–99.
186. See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 179, at 5 (noting a trend in Eastern Europe toward populists).
187. See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Governing Beyond Imagination: The ‘World Historical’ Sources
of Democratic Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV. 649, 655–60 (2014).
188. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17–46 (2d ed. 2016).
189. See Stephanie Pappas, Why So Many Americans Don’t ‘Believe’ in Evolution, Climate
Change and Vaccines, HUFF POST (Jan. 25, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-americans-deny-evolution-climate-and-vaccine-science_us_5888cd7ce4b098c0bba7db84;
CARY FUNK & BRIAN KENNEDY, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE 19–29 (2016),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/.
190. Chinn, supra note 182, at 302.
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fiercely.191 More and more Americans obtain most of their information about
politics from sources that do little more than confirm their world views. Maxwell Stearns speaks of “information silos” and “the confirmation-biasing
tendencies of the breakdown of traditional media.”192 American and global
commitments to cultural pluralism are weakening. The United States is experiencing what has been described as “the Great Disinhibition,” as prejudices formerly kept in the closet now find increasing avenues for expression.193 Chinn’s paper in this symposium discusses “the weakening or
disappearance of structures of commonality in American society” that allow
for pluralism while containing the more tribal elements of pluralism.194 New
methods of communication enable bigots to threaten, with near impunity,
members of historically disadvantaged groups who seek to participate in public discourse and disrupt intelligent conversations on matters of public importance.195 Millions of Americans who would never march in a white supremacist rally nevertheless blame persons of color and immigrants for all
the ills of their lives196 and see racial minorities, African-Americans in particular, as “special favorite[s] of the law.”197 The left as well as the right is
wracked by problems of pluralism. Much evidence indicates that persons
who voted for Hillary Clinton and persons who voted for Bernie Sanders in
the Democratic primary had difficulty holding civil political conversations
with each other.198

191. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence of Political
Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 323 (2010).
192. Maxwell L. Stearns, Reflections on the Aftermath of Election 2016, 77 MD. L. REV. 271,
277 (2017).
193. Josh Marshall, The Great Disinhibition, TALKING POINTS MEMO: EDITOR’S BLOG (Nov.
18, 2016, 10:57 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/edblog/the-great-disinhibition.
194. Chinn, supra note 182, at 292.
195. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 35–95 (2014).
196. See Stanley Greenberg, The Democrats’ ‘Working Class Problem,’ AM. PROSPECT (June
1, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/democrats%E2%80%99-%E2%80%98working-class-problem%E2%80%99. See generally STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE
POLITICS AND POWER OF THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY (rev. ed. 1996) (reviewing the “middle
class revolt against politics” in the 1990s).
197. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883): see also Chinn, supra note 182, at 292–95 (noting the consequences of Trump for a variety of vulnerable groups); Terry Smith, White Backlash in
a Brown County, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 89, 109 (2015) (discussing the racial backlash leading to the
Tea Party).
198. See, e.g., MARK LILLA, THE ONCE AND FUTURE LIBERAL: AFTER IDENTITY POLITICS
(2017); Beverly Cage, An Intellectual Historian Argues His Case Against Identity Politics, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017) (book review), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/books/review/marklilla-the-once-and-future-liberal.html. Better yet, see my Facebook page whenever Sanders or Clinton is in the news.
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The resulting polarization inhibits compromise between and within political parties and political movements.199 David Law points out how “the
inherent reliance of social media on preexisting social ties and membership
in self-selecting networks of affinity implies the tribalization of information
flows: as reliance on social media for news continues to grow, both content
and distribution will increasingly track preexisting tribal divisions.”200 Israel
is one of many countries facing particularly virulent forms of these challenges. Mordechay and Roznai note the increased political appeal in Israeli
politics of anti-Arab racism and the Netanyahu administration’s efforts to enforce cultural loyalty.201
Economic equality, long thought to be a vital prerequisite to a functioning constitutional democracy, is decreasing sharply throughout the universe
of constitutional democracy. Ganesh Sitaraman declares, “The number one
threat to American constitutional government today is the collapse of the
middle class.”202 “The problem of economic insecurity,” Law observes, “is
the Achilles heel of liberal democracy.”203 The top one percent in the United
States and elsewhere has gained an increased share of the national wealth
with substantial consequences for both electoral politics and economic mobility.204 The upper-middle class and above is becoming increasingly immune to downturns in the economy. Poor citizens, a disproportionate number
of which are persons of color, women, and children, gain the least during
good economic times.205
The combination of policy disasters by incompetent governing officials,
prejudices inflamed by new media, information silos, and economic inequality is weakening commitments to constitutional democracy in the United
States and throughout the world. Law notes the increasing attractiveness of
an Asian model in which democratic freedoms are few, but consumer goods
are often plentiful. His contribution suggests that ordinary citizens accept a
199. See Dawood, supra note 178, at 198–99; AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE
SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY GOVERNING DEMANDS IT AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES IT
(2012).
200. David S. Law, Alternatives to Liberal Constitutional Democracy, 77 MD. L. REV. 223, 229
(2017) (footnote omitted).
201. Mordechay & Roznai, supra note 76, at 251–65.
202. GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION: WHY
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC 3 (2017).
203. Law, supra note 200, at 230.
204. See MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
205. See Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Distributional National Accounts: Methods and Estimates for the United States, ___ Q.J. ECON. ___ (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3–4), https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx043; Jana Kasperkevic, The 1% Are Recovering from
the 2008 Recession While 99% Are Still Waiting, GUARDIAN (July 6, 2016, 12:15 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/06/one-percent-2008-recession-recovery-income.
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bureaucratic authoritarianism that makes trains (if not buses) run on time.206
Constitutional arrangements, by comparison, may be producing the wrong
goods. “How compelling is the response that we constitutional lawyers
have,” he asks, “as keepers of the faith in liberal constitutional democracy, to
the argument that democracy is inherently vulnerable to some combination
of ignorance, tribalism, and fear?”207
The path of constitutional law influences constitutional retrogression at
the margins,208 but no serious scholar claims that judicial decisions bear the
brunt of the blame for poorly qualified political leaders, a badly informed
public, weakened commitments to pluralism, and increasing economic inequality. Rather, the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of
other constitutional democracies are constructing and constituting politics in
ways that privilege the election of celebrities more interested in exploiting
than understanding the political world, that privilege spokespersons for narrow interests and cultural fears at the expense of persons who speak for
broader public interests, and that privilege global elites at the expense of the
citizens needed to form a strong middle class. The fault in the United States
may lie in trying to operate an undemocratic and inefficient eighteenth-century constitution in a twenty-first century world,209 in failing to acknowledge
that “our constitutional democracy rests on premises that no longer hold,”210
in a “thickening” of political time that prevents any substantive reform,211 or
perhaps in a constitutional culture that is no longer capable of sustaining a
constitutional democracy, but not in politics and law being too intertwined.
Part II of this Essay details how law is no more or less integrated with politics
at present than in the past.212 The problems with contemporary constitutional
democracy lie in how law and politics are integrated. We can obtain better
constitutional law only by obtaining a better constitutional politics. Dawood
properly recognizes that “it is the interaction between constitutional and po-

206. See Law, supra note 200, at 231–43.
207. Id. at 242.
208. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
209. See LEVINSON, supra note 176.
210. Stearns, supra note 192, at 274; see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED
DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017).
211. Eric Lomazoff, Why Donald Trump Is Not Andrew Jackson (and Why that Matters for
American Constitutional Democracy), 77 MD. L. REV. 280, 284–85 (2017) (quoting STEPHEN
SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO BILL
CLINTON 31 (1997) (discussing the results of an “institutional thickening on the politics of leadership”)).
212. See supra Part II.
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litical factors that will be determinative of” the survival of American constitutional democracy, “rather than the strengths and deficiencies of the Constitution on its own.”213
Constitutional politics challenges the means offered by the New Deal
conceptual universe for achieving constitutional reform. That conceptual
universe provides one place for constitutional change, points to the nine persons who must be persuaded, and offers one language for persuasion. Constitutional politics provides multiple places for constitutional change, points
to the different people who hold privileged positions in these different places
who must be persuaded, and offers different persuasive languages for convincing different persons in different places to make constitutional changes.
Localities are alternatives to federal courts. Some states granted same-sex
couples the right to marry before the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v.
Hodges.214 Elected officials are alternatives to judges. Gubernatorial commutations, as well as judicial stays, halt executions. Popular constitutional
rhetoric is an alternative to legality. Courts routinely reject legal claims based
on the Declaration of Independence,215 but such constitutional rhetoric is often powerful when employed by political movements in electoral and legislative settings.216
This constitutional politics is more dynamic than the static world view
presented by the law/politics distinction. Americans throughout history have
altered the places for constitutional change, the persons who must be persuaded, and the language of persuasion. The constitutional powers of all
branches of the national government have waxed and waned throughout
American history.217 Political movements and elected officials constantly
contest the partisan composition of the federal judiciary.218 Legal entrepreneurs transform the dominant methods of constitutional discourse.219 Reformers may nevertheless change these elements of constitutional politics

213. Dawood, supra note 178, at 196.
214. See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed.
2017); DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2006).
215. Mark A. Graber, The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Pedagogy, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. 509, 515–16 (2016)
216. See ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012).
217. See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS (1981).
218. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 111.
219. See, e.g., PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION (2014); Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the
Rise of the Notion of the ‘Living Constitution’ in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD.
IN AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997).
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only by making creative use of the existing places where people may be persuaded, the people who must be persuaded, and the languages by which they
might be persuaded.
Constitutional politics can be improved only by politics. Work that
demonstrates the political foundations of judicial power undermines the inherited belief that law can protect us from politics, i.e., that if politics is the
problem, then law is the solution. The foundations for constitutional democracy, which contemporary constitutional politics are undermining, can be
buttressed only by materials found within contemporary constitutional orders. Quentin Skinner’s aphorism, “all revolutionaries . . . march backwards
into battle,”220 captures how persons modifying or replacing a failing regime
justify their reforms by using the language of the old constitutional order that
their audience understands and accepts. Julie Novkov’s work on the New
Deal Constitutional Revolution details how Hughes Court Justices were able
to provide constitutional foundations for minimum wage and maximum
hours laws by ascribing longstanding characteristics of women workers to
workers of all sexes.221 Stephen Skowronek observes how all new institutions bear the imprint of the old institutions that gave birth to them. The
politics of the pre-administrative state in the United States, he details, structured the institutions of the administrative state.222 The Supreme Court has
played a major role in American constitutional development because new coalitions coming to power consistently conclude that they will best promote
their constitutional visions by modifying existing activist practices rather
than by building a new federal judiciary.223
The relationship between constitutional stability and constitutional
change has important consequences for efforts to restore the preconditions of
constitutional democracy in the United States and throughout the world. No
Archimedean point exists outside of politics that provides foundations for
creating or imagining better constitutional regimes. Successful reformers
must acquire power either through existing channels of power or by using the
tools that contemporary constitutional politics provides for modifying existing channels of power. The means used by reformers to change the existing
constitutional order will, in turn, structure the new constitutional order. Replacing Donald Trump by impeachment has different constitutional consequences than replacing Trump’s Republican Party by election.

220. QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS: REGARDING METHOD 149–50 (2002).
221. See NOVKOV, supra note 108, at 183–240.
222. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1982).
223. See WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1989).
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The conceptual order schmoozers are fashioning celebrates good politics, abandoning the world view that demeaned all politics as a lower form of
constitutional behavior. This good politics consists of the persuasion, mobilization, and policies necessary to sustain the conditions for constitutional
democracy and to improve a regime’s capacity to realize constitutional ideals
or, in the case of the United States, the American constitutional ideals. This
constitutional politics is a politics of better and worse rather than one of legal
truth and error. Chief Justice Earl Warren spoke the language of the New
Deal conceptual universe when he rejoiced in the judicial capacity to provide
litigants with “a whole loaf.”224 Constitutional politics offers no similar hope
for redemption. The half a loaf reformers we might gain, should their constitutional efforts successfully persuade our fellow citizens of the virtues of
intelligence, science, pluralism, and economic equality, seems meager from
the Olympian heights of law. Nevertheless, the bread obtained through constitutional politics serves those throughout the world who are metaphorically
starving for some justice and less metaphorically starving for any nourishment.
Abraham Lincoln concluded his second annual message to Congress by
declaring,
Fellow-citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress
and this administration, will be remembered in spite of ourselves.
No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass, will light us
down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation.225
We can no more escape politics than we can escape history. Constitutional democracy will survive the fiery trial through which those governing
practices are passing only if constitutional democrats persuade our fellow citizens of the virtues and preconditions of constitutional democracy through
existing channels of communication and mobilization, or through the new
channels of communication and mobilization they devise using the materials
provided by contemporary constitutionalism. A constitutional theory rooted
in a constitutional politics committed to constitutional democracy must provide persuasive reasons for thinking that elected officials and political actors
need experience and intelligence, that public policy must be based on sound
science rather than religious or ideological dogma, that modern pluralist societies are here to stay and offer the best possibility for human flourishing,
and that a constitutional democracy without a vibrant and diverse middle

224. See EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 6 (1977) (noting that the Supreme
Court is not where one “take[s] a half a loaf where a whole loaf could not be obtained”).
225. Abraham Lincoln, Second Annual Message to Congress, (Dec. 1, 1862), in COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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class is a practical political contradiction. If we as a collective, as a society
and as a species fail in this constitutional endeavor, we may not be remembered in spite of ourselves only because the high probability exists that our
failure will leave no institutions capable of preserving memory or worse, no
selves to do the remembering.

